Protecting Children or Punishing Mothers: Gender, Race, and Class in the Child Protection System [An Essay] by Appell, Annette R.
South Carolina Law Review 
Volume 48 Issue 3 Article 4 
Spring 1997 
Protecting Children or Punishing Mothers: Gender, Race, and 
Class in the Child Protection System [An Essay] 
Annette R. Appell 
University of South Carolina 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Annette R. Appell, Protecting Children or Punishing Mothers: Gender, Race, and Class in the Child 
Protection System [An Essay], 48 S. C. L. Rev. 577 (1997). 
This Article is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in South Carolina Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please 
contact dillarda@mailbox.sc.edu. 
PROTECTING CHILDREN OR PUNISHING
MOTHERS: GENDER, RACE, AND CLASS IN THE
CHILD PROTECTION SYSTEM
[AN ESSAY]
Annette R. Appell
INTRODUCTION .................................. 51
PART ONE: THE CHILD PROTECTION SYSTEM ............. 5E
A. The Mechanics of State Intervention ............... 5E
B. The Families Involved in the Child Protection System .... 5E
PART TWO: CONCRETE EXAMPLES OF BIAS. .............. 5
A. Objective Indicators of Systemic Bias: Violence and Drugs . 5E
B. Three Case Studies ...............
1. Janice ..................
2. Sarah ....................
3. DeeDee .................
PART THREE: SHARED THEMES ...........
A. Failure To Utilize Existing Support Systems
B. Ill-defined Scope of Involvement .......
C. Failure To Provide Meaningful Services . .
D. Elevation of Form Over Substance .....
E. Failure To Provide for the Children .....
F. A Caveat .....................
PART FOUR: CAUSES AND SUGGESTIONS ......
A. Child Protection Bureaucracies .......
B. Legal Grounds for State Involvement ....
1. The Parent-Focused Inquiry ....
a. Intervention .........
b. Extrication ..........
2. The Child-Focused Inquiry .....
a. Intervention .........
b. Extrication ..........
3. The Parent-Child Focused Inquiry .
a. Intervention .........
.......... 589
.......... 591
.......... 593
.......... 594
.......... 595
.......... 596
.......... 596
.......... 597
.......... 598
.......... 598
.......... 599
........... 600
.......... 600
.......... 603
.......... 603
.......... 604
.......... 605
.......... 607
.......... 608
.......... 609
.......... 610
.......... 611
* Assistant Law Professor, University of South Carolina School of Law. The author thanks
Jane Aiken, Pam Mohr, and Lynn Weber for reviewing earlier drafts of this essay, Vicki Johnson
for related research assistance, and the University of South Carolina School of Law for research
support. The author also thanks members of the Ohio State Law School faculty and members of
Chicago Feminist Law Teachers and Friends for stimulating her thoughts on some of the themes
that eventually found their way into this essay.
1
Appell: Protecting Children or Punishing Mothers: Gender, Race, and Class
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
b. Extrication .................... 612
CONCLUSION ................................ 613
INTRODUCTION
Towering over the three-story office buildings, storefronts, and run-down
houses and apartment buildings on Chicago's near southwest side stands a tall,
gleaming white building. Outside of that building, a line consisting predomi-
nately of African American women and children winds out the door and
extends half way down the block.' These women are not waiting for a sale, to
purchase concert tickets, or to apply for a job. They are waiting to enter the
city's juvenile court where matters involving child abuse and neglect are
heard. They are the mothers, grandmothers, aunts, cousins, and foster mothers
of children who allegedly have been abused or neglected or are in some way
dependant.
This scene-or what it connotes-is not an anomaly in the world of child
protection. On the contrary, it is at once vividly descriptive and symbolic of
a system of family law in this country that is growing yet continues to exist in
a marginalized state. Nationwide, juvenile courts and child protection agencies
target hundreds of thousands of mothers who are disproportionately poor and
of color, even though child abuse and neglect is not confined to any social
class or race.2 The protective systems, themselves challenged by high
employee turnover, poor allocation of resources and difficult mandates,
specifically identify and treat these mothers based largely on race, class, and
gender. 3 In the meantime, although such treatment is in the name of child
protection, children too often experience other harms as a result of and while
in protective care.
1. Although not as visible as their race and gender, poverty is also dominant among these
women.
2. Marie Ashe, "Bad Mothers," "Good Lawyers, "and "Legal Ethics", 81 GEo. L.J. 2533,
2556 (1993). But see U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE
THIRD NATIONAL INCIDENCE STUDY OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT (NIS-3) 10-12 (1996)
[hereinafter NIS-3 Executive Summary] (suggesting a correlation between poverty and child
maltreatment).
3. Bias in child protection proceedings is deep, complicated, and obscure. Without doubt,
the bias faced by women in these proceedings is directly and inextricably related to larger social
policies which harm women; the larger context is, however, beyond the scope of this essay. Such
societal pressures resonate in the world of child protection which nevertheless attempts to
"conceall] these conditions behind the cloak of legal objectivity." BernadineDohm, BadMothers,
Good Mothers, and the State: Children on the Margins, 2 ROUNDTABLE 1, 5 (1995).
[Vol. 48:577
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Nearly half of a million children are in foster care in this country,4 an
ironic state of affairs in view of the high political currency of "family
values. "I Indeed, removing children from their families runs counter to what
the dominant culture knows about its own families, which despite their failings
are viable and worthy of respect. A possible explanation is that "other families
are not viewed as "real families," so the larger society tolerates their fissure.
Otherwise, there surely would be an outcry about these half-million children
separated from their parents.6
This "othering" of poor families, particularly when they are of color,
makes it easy for the dominant culture to devalue them: to view them as
dysfunctional and not families at all.' Just as these families are not families,
these mothers are not really mothers.' They deviate from the normative
notions of mother and womanhood and are defined as bad.9 The result is an
often punitive, rather than empowering, system focused more on mothers than
on their children."0 This punitive maternal focus serves both to decontextualize
4. CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, THE STATE OF AMERICAN'S CHILDREN YEARBOOK
1994 89 (1994) (stating that by the end of 1992, 438,427 children were in foster care).
5. See, e.g., Clif LeBlanc, License Tags Sing Beasley's Theme, THE STATE (Columbia),
Feb. 22, 1997, at Al (reporting thatSouth Carolina's new license plates are anticipated to contain
the slogan "Putting Families First," which also happened to be the state governor's campaign
slogan).
6. This tolerance would appear to be part and parcel of this country's psyche. See Dorothy
E. Roberts, The Unrealized Power of Mother, 5 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 141, 146 (1995)
("Black mothers' bonds with their children have been marked by brutal disruption, beginning with
the slave auction where family members were sold to different masters and continuing in the
disproportionate state removal of Black children to foster care.").
7. See, e.g., Bob Secter, Children's Guardian Draws Criticism, CHI.-SUN TIMES, Mar. 20,
1995, at 1 (quoting a public official's statement regarding a seriously disturbed mother and her
son: "There is no family to preserve"); Elizabeth Bartholet, BloodParentsvs. RealParents, N.Y.
TIMES, July 13, 1993, at A19 (stating "[t]he law should stop defining parenting in terms of
procreation and recognize that true family ties have little to do with blood"). Child protection
doctrine affirms this attitude by construing child abuse and neglect as an individual problem that
can be fixed by individual therapeutic intervention. Barbara Nelson, Making an Issue of Child
Abuse, in FAMILY MATTERS 232-45 (Martha Minow ed., 1993).
8. Dorothy Roberts has noted that African American women-by virtue of their race and
regardless of class-cannot meet the ideal of motherhood because that ideal is white; as a result,
their prosecution for being bad mothers is more acceptable. Dorothy E. Roberts, Racism and
Patriarchy in the Meaning of Motherhood, 1 AM. U. 1. GENDER & L. 1, 15 (1993).
9. Odeana R. Neal, Myths and Moms: Images of Women and Termination of ParentalRights,
5 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 61, 61 (1995); see Dohm, supra note 3, at 6 (stating "[f]rom the
beginning, the juvenile courts and the broader social welfare system intervened in the lives of
destitute women to regulate and monitor their behavior, punish them for 'deviant' mothering
practices, and police the undeserving poor"); see also Peggy Cooper Davis, The Good Mother:
A New Look at Psychological Parent Theory, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CIIANGE 347, 365-66
(1996) (noting that mothers are blamed when there are problems).
10. Leroy H. Pelton, EnablingPublic Child Welfare Agencies to PromoteFamily Preservation,
1997]
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women from the larger familial, institutional, and societal factors that mothers
experience" and to expand the scope of state intervention beyond child
protection into every realm of mothers' lives in the name of making them good
mothers.
This essay addresses the policies, practices, and perspectives that help to
fuel the growing industry that has arisen from the state's"2 "protective"
involvement with poor families and families of color and the state's punitive
treatment of the mothers of these families. This essay, further, challenges the
sine qua non behind the punitive treatment of these mothers and the state's
protective scheme: that it is good for children. Because the state's reasons for
both initial and continuing intervention are ill-defined and maternally-focused,
state intervention often fails to meet children's basic needs for love, stability,
continuity, and timely determination of legal status. 3
Part one of this essay describes the legal and bureaucratic, framework of
coercive state intervention and how the state directs its actions based largely
on the gender, race, and class of parents. Part two focuses on concrete
examples of gender bias in child protection proceedings. The illustrations
unfold first by presenting objective indicators of how women are singled out
for their behavior or status and then by presenting a more subjective picture
of how women and their families experience intervention. Part three points out
shared failings of the various child protection systems. Finally, part four
addresses some of the bureaucratic and legal factors that help perpetuate biased
and punitive systems and explores some suggestions for improvement.
38 Soc. WORK 491, 491 (1993); Martin Guggenheim, The Political and Legal Implications of
The Psychological Parenting Theory, 12 N.Y.U. Rav. L. & Soc. CHANGE 549 (1983-84). Not
all juvenile or family courts are punitive. On the contrary, a good juvenile court exists to protect
children, not to assign blame. For descriptions of three such courts, see MARK HARDIN, ET AL.,
A SECOND COURT THAT WORKS: JUDICIAL IMPLEMENTATION OF PERMANENCY PLANNING
REFORMS (1995); MARK HARDIN, JUDICIAL IMPLEMENTATION OF PERMANENCY PLANNING
REFORM: ONE COURT THAT WORKS (1992); Andrew Gottesman, 2 Cities Can Teach Chicago
Juvenile Court Lessons, CHI. TRm., Dec. 22, 1993, at 1.
11. Bernadine Dohrn characterized this phenomenon as one of "legal isolation from social
context, institutional neglect, and complex relationships of power [that] therefore relies
exclusively on individual maternal accountability and blame. Fathers, step-fathers, and
'boyfriends,' as well as larger social institutions, are absent during the legal and moral
adjudication of mothers." Dohrn, supra note 3, at 2-3.
12. As used in this essay, "state" refers to either or both governmental child protection
agencies and the courts that adjudicate and oversee abuse and neglect cases.
13. See Roger J.R. Levesque, The Failure of Foster Care Reform: Revolutionizing the Most
Radical Blueprint, MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1, 1-2 (1995); see also Louise Kiernan &
Sue Ellen Christian, Juvenile Court Plays the Waiting Game, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 7, 1997, § 2, at
1 (citing a study finding that 90% of children who came into foster care in 1993 and 1994 had
not been returned home by mid-1996).
[Vol. 48:577
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PART ONE: THE CHILD PROTECTION SYSTEM
Historically there have been and there continue to be two systems of
family law, one public and the other private. The private system adjudicates
custody among relatively wealthy parents in divorce or domestic relations
courts; the public system adjudicates custody among the state and predominate-
ly poor mothers in child protection courts. 4 The law of the public forum is
also known as poor persons' family law.'5 It originated from state placement
of poor children in asylums, indentured service, or with other families, and
during this century, it has evolved into the modem foster care system. 16 In
contrast, private family law is based on the doctrines of inheritance and
property. 7 Currently, it primarily encompasses custody disputes among
family members, usually parents, as a result of divorce, inheritance, and
adoption."
A key difference between the private and public systems, at least
historically, is that the former is more deferential to parental rights and family
autonomy, whereas the latter is more tolerant of, indeed at times has
mandated, state usurpation of custody.' 9 Although constitutional doctrine has
evolved in the latter half of the twentieth century to ensure protection of the
rights of poor parents,' the government still coercively intervenes more
readily into the custodial relations of poor families.2'
14. See e.g., MARY ANN MASON, FROM FATHER'S PROPERTY TO CHILDREN'S RIGHTS 189-90
(1994) ("the law has maintained a two-tiered system in dealing with poor children and relatively
rich children in custody matters"); Jamil S. Zainaldin, The Emergence of a Modem American
Family Law: Child Custody, Adoption and the Courts, 1796-1851, 73 Nw. U. L. REv. 1038,
1039-41 (1979) (stating that poor laws governed poor families and patriarchal rules governed
other families); see also Donald N. Duquette, Child Protection Legal Process: Comparing the
United States and Great Britain, 54 U. PITT. L. REv. 239, 255 (1992) (noting how child
protection proceedings are heard in separate court calls in this country).
15. Marsha Garrison, IWhy Terminate ParentalRights?, 35 STAN. L. REv. 423, 433 (1983).
16. MASON, supra note 14 at 189-90; see also Tim Hasci, From Indenture to Family Foster
Care: A BrieffHistory of Child Placing, 74 CHILD WELFARE 162 (1995) (describing the evolution
of indentured service, asylums and other protection of poor children to the foster care system);
Garrison, supra note 15, at 432 (stating that "[t]he foster care system's lack of concern for
natural parents reflects centuries of a dual family law-one for the rich and one for the poor").
17. Garrison, supra note 15, at 434.
18. Around 20 % of adoptions nationwide are of foster children. Unif. Adoption Act prefatory
note, 9 U.L.A. 2 (1994). Disregarding this rather significant statistic, adoption law tends to focus
mostly on the private adoption of anonymous infants through consent of their parents. Annette
Ruth Appell, Blending Families Through Adoption: Implications for CollaborativeAdoption Law
and Practice, 75 B.U. L. REv. 997, 1000 (1995).
19. Garrison, supra note 15, at 432-37.
20. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 117 S. Ct. 555 (1996); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982);
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality
& Reform, 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
21. Garrison, supra note 15, at 432-37; Annette R. Appell & Bruce A. Boyer, ParentalRights
19971
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A. The Mechanics of State Intervention
Normally, state protective involvement with families begins with a call to
a child abuse hotline. 2 Neighbors, educators, health care professionals, social
workers, and family members are the most frequent callers.' Upon receiving
a report of child abuse or neglect, the receiving agency will investigate any
substantial allegations.24 If the agency determines that a child has been harmed
or is at risk of harm, it can either provide services to the family to ameliorate
the problems or petition the case into court to seek court supervision of the
family or removal of the child from the home. Actually, federal law requires
child protection agencies to attempt to protect the child within the home rather
than pursue removal.'
If the child protection agency seeks custody of a child, it must bring the
case to court, unless the parents have agreed to placement. In a contested case,
the court will probably appoint counsel for the parents. Appointed counselors,
however, are likely to have few resources, little training, and high case-
loads.26 The court will also appoint the child an advocate who may or may not
be a lawyer and may or may not be trained in pediatric law, child develop-
ment, or the myriad of other disciplines that prepare professionals to make
good decisions on behalf of children.27
Once the state removes a child, federal law requires the state to make
"reasonable efforts" to return the child home and to monitor the child while
in foster care.' Toward this end, an agency must draft a case plan for each
vs. the Best Interests of the Child: A False Dichotomy in the Context of Adoption, 2 DUKE J.
GENDER L. & POL'Y, 63, 79 (1995).
22. Federal law mandates that states receiving federal child protection funds maintain child
abuse hotlines. Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5101 (1994).
23. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILD MALTREATMENT 1994: REPORTS FROM
THE STATES TO THE NAT'L CTR. ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 3-3 (1996). Most states
mandate that educators, medical and mental health professionals, police and, in some states,
lawyers, report or risk fines or loss of licensure. Robert P. Mosteller, Child Abuse Reporting
Laws and Attorney-Client Confidences: The Reality and the Specter of Lawyer as Informant, 42
DUKE L.J. 203, 213-14 (1992). Other citizens are permitted to call in most states. Id. at 216.
24. 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(A)(iii).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(A) (1994).
26. It is typical for parent defenders to carry caseloads of 500 in urban jurisdictions. David
J. Herring, Exploring the Political Roles of the Family: Justifications for Permanency Planning
for Children, Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 183, 204, n.142 (1995). Demonstrating the typical failings, the
system of appointment in South Carolina calls attorneys at random from among the general bar
without regard to their practice background, experience or resources. Indeed, South Carolina does
not even pay its appointees for their time or expenses.
27. See Recommendations of the Conference on Ethical Issues in the Legal Representation of
Children, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 1301, 1309 (1996); Donald N. Duquette & Sarah H. Ramsey,
Representation of Children in Child Abuse and Neglect Cases: An Empirical Look at What
Constitutes Effective Representation, 20 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 341, 351 (1987).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15). Unfortunately, the United States Supreme Court compromised
[Vol. 48:577
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child.29 These plans primarily consist of tasks for a mother to complete in
order to have her child returned. Although good social work practice mandates
that the assigned caseworker and the mother draft these plans
collaboratively,3" it is more common for caseworkers to make the plans on
their own, and in some instances, caseworkers use pretyped, generic forms
that obligate the mother to submit to drug tests, go to counseling, submit to
psychological evaluations, attend parenting classes, and visit the child.31 These
plans may also require the agency and foster parents to complete certain tasks,
such as to arrange for services for the child or parent and to provide
reasonable visitation. Finally, federal law requires the court or agency to
review these plans every six months.32
In the meantime, the courts oversee or decide such things as whether the
child should be in the home or in foster care, the parameters of parent-child
visiting, and whether the child protection agency is performing its duties,
including its duty to make reasonable efforts toward family reunification.33 If
there is a significant barrier to reunification, such as the mother's poor
progress or prognosis for abiding with her plan, the court may terminate
parental rights so the child can be adopted by someone else.34
enforcement of this requirement when it ruled that "reasonable efforts" was too vague a term for
courts to enforce. Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347 (1992). The Supreme Court's decision is
particularly surprising given the doctrinal pervasiveness of "reasonable" in local and federal law.
29. 42 U.S.C. § 675(1)(B) (Supp. 1996). Case plans should include:
A plan for assuring that the child receives proper care and that services are
provided to the parents, child and foster parents in order to improve the conditions
in the parents' home, facilitate return of the child to his own home or the permanent
placement of the child, and address the needs of the child while in foster care ....
Id.
30. See Linda Katz, Effective Permanency Planning for Children in Foster Care, 35 Soc.
WORK 220, 221 (1990).
31. This is the experience of the author, as well as others familiar with the child welfare
system. See, e.g., Herring, supra note 26, at 200-01.
32. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(B).
33. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-762 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1996).
34. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-490 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1996); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT.
40512-29(2) (West 1993). Unfortunately, termination of parental rights does not necessarily lead
to adoption placements. Matthew B. Johnson, Examining Risks to Children in the Context of
ParentalRights Termination Proceedings, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 397, 413 (1996).
As a result, states may be creating legal orphans by terminating parental rights when there is no
one to adopt the child. See Martin Guggenheim, The Effects of Recent Trends to Accelerate the
Termination of ParentalRights of Children in Foster Care-An EmpiricalAnalysis in Two States,
29 FAM. L.Q. 121 (1995) (referencing a study that found many children whose parents' parental
rights are terminated are not being adopted).
19971
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B. The Families Involved in the Child Protection System
The mothers and children "served" by the public, protective system are
overwhelmingly poor and disproportionately of color. 5 Poor families are more
susceptible to state intervention because they lack power and resources and
because they are more directly involved with governmental agencies." For
example, the state must have probable cause to enter the homes of most
Americans, yet women receiving aid to families with dependant children
(AFDC) are not entitled to such privacy.3" In addition to receiving direct
public benefits (like AFDC and Medicaid), poor families lead more public
lives than their middle-class counterparts: rather than visiting private doctors,
poor families are likely to attend public clinics and emergency rooms for
routine medical care;3" rather than hiring contractors to fix their homes, poor
families encounter public building inspectors; rather than using their cars to
run errands, poor mothers use public transportation.
Of course, the vast majority of the parents involved in the child protective
system are mothers.39 Men are rarely brought into court, held accountable, or
viewed as resources for their children.' When fathers are involved in the
proceedings, they are usually subject to lower expectations4 and are
35. Peggy Cooper Davis & Gautam Barua, Custodial Choices for Children at Risk: Bias,
Sequentiality, and the Law, 2 ROUNDTABLE 139, 150 (1995). This race disproportionality is
particularly shocking in view of findings that there is no correlation between race and rates of
child maltreatment. NIS-3 Executive Summary, supra note 2, at 7-8. African American children
make up 39 to 42.4% of the children in foster care-grossly disproportionate to their 15%
representation in the general population. Annie Woodley Brown & Barbara Bailey-Etta, An Out-
of-Home Care System in Crisis: Implications forAfrican American Children in the Child Welfare
System, 76 CHILD WELFARE 65, 74-75 (1997). Latino children are only slightly over represented
in foster care where they make up 11.8% of foster children, versus 10% in the general
population. Id. Native American Children make up at least 1.9% of the foster care population.
Id. at 75.
36. See Brown, supra note 35, at 71.
37. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971) (holding that women receiving AFDC mustpermit
state social workers to enter their homes even though the visits shared some characteristics of a
Fourth Amendment search and seizure for which a warrant would normally be required).
38. Doctors have noted that these women are also more likely than their middle-class
counterparts to be reported to government authorities.because doctors serving paying clients are
less likely to make child abuse reports, unless referrals diminish. See Ira J. Chasnoff, et al., The
Prevalence of Illicit-Drug or Alcohol Use During Pregnancy and Discrepancies in Mandatory
Reporting in Pinellas County, Florida, 322 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1202, 1205 (1990) (postulating
that private obstetricians and hospitals may be less likely to diagnose prenatal drug use "for fear
of adverse patient reactions and the loss of future referrals").
39. Ashe, supra note 2, at 2542.
40. See id.; Dohm, supra note 3, at 5.
41. Mary E. Becker, Double Binds Facing Mothers in Abusive Families: Social Support
Systems, Custody Outcomes, and Liability for Acts of Others, 2 ROUNDTABLE 13, 15 (1995)
(noting the double standard for judgments of parenting depending on whether the parent be
[Vol. 48:577
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significantly less likely to be criminally charged with neglect or passive abuse
of their children. Women, on the other hand, are more frequently charged
under such laws, even when they had nothing to do with the abuse.42
Thus, because poor families are more public and interact so frequently
with governmental agencies, their problems are more visible to the child
protection authorities. But this is not the entire story. In contrast to the largely
poor and disproportionately African American families who constitute the main
recipients of child protection services, the judges, caseworkers, and attorneys
are mostly middle-class and white.43 Many agencies and the individuals that
monitor these families see them as pathological, incompetent, and less worthy
of preservation.' Neither the families nor their heads-the mothers-fit
dominant cultural paradigms, such as white, married, middle-class, and
suburban.
The mothers have evaded the white middle-class mother norms-or
myths-in a number of ways. First and foremost they are poor. Food, jobs,
and decent housing are elusive. Five sisters may live together with their fifteen
children in a roach infested slum:45 their only other housing option being a
roach infested apartment in a public housing high-rise where their children will
be in daily danger of being shot or "shaken down." Because they live where
they do, the state charges these mothers with neglect for subjecting their
children to an injurious environment.46
These mothers do not have access to affordable childcare. They depend
on informal kinship and community networks for babysitting. If a mother
leaves her child with a neighbor or an aunt, rather than with a nanny or in a
licensed day-care center, she is considered to have neglected her child.47 In
mother or father).
42. Dorothy E. Roberts, Motherhood and Crime, 79 IowA L. REv. 95, 95-96 (1993).
43. By definition they (particularly the better paid lawyers and judges) are middle-class, even
if they were raised in poverty. See Louise Kiernan, Children on Trial, CHI. TRIB. MAG. Jan. 19,
1997 at 11 (stating that [jiuvenile court "is a place where mostly white, middle-class lawyers and
judges make decisions about the lives of families and children who are mostly black, Hispanic
and poor"); KAREN AILEEN HowzE, MAKING DIFTERENCES WORK 1-2 (1996) (describing race
disparity and one instance of court personnel surprise that an African American woman in
juvenile court was there as an attorney, not a mother).
44. See Margaret Beyer, Too Little, Too Late: Designing Family Support to Succeed, 22
N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 311, 312-13 (1996) (noting the tendency of social workers to
"rescue" children from their parents); Garrison, supra note 15, at 424.
45. SeeRayLong, D CFS Poverty Cases RisingDramatically, CHI. SUN TIMES, July 21, 1994)
at 12 (describing such cases).
46. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 19-3-301 to -401 (Supp. 1996); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT.
405/2-3(1)(b) (West 1993) (stating that a neglected child includes a one "whose environment is
injurious to his or her welfare"). In Illinois, in one year alone, the state removed nearly 1,000
children from their homes based on this allegation. See Long, supra note 45.
47. Peggy C. Davis & Richard G. Dudley, Jr., The Black Family in Modem Slavery, THE
BLAcKLETrER J., Spring 1987, at 9, 12-13.
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fact, extended family and kin networks so prevalent in non-white communi-
ties48 do not fit the white middle class norm in which the mother is primary
care-giver, supported by her husband and paid childcare.49 Because the rich
tradition of extended family or kin care is not normative, the child protection
system does not recognize it as family and views the mothers who rely on that
tradition as having abrogated their maternal roles and duties. 5"
Poor mothers are more likely to live in high risk areas under high stress
related to the blight and violence which sutrounds them and under the strain
of living on government benefits that are below subsistence level. Some days,
having the money or energy to do one more thing, such as to take three buses
to go shopping or to visit a child, is just too much. When judged by someone
who has a car or car-fare and who does not have to spend much time worrying
about obtaining food, clean clothing, toiletries, or dodging bullets and crack
dealers, these mothers appear not to care enough about mothering."'
These women are challenged for being self-determinative and are punished
for having sex and producing children with men to whom they are not
married.5" They are punished for disobedience, i.e., for refusing to comply
with state or judicial directives no matter how irrelevant they may be to
women's lives. They are punished for independent thought and any other
deviation from gender norms. For example, a mother may be chastised for
48. See, e.g., Carol B. Stack, Cultural Perspectives on Child Welfare, 12 N.Y.U. REV. L.
& SOc. CHANGE 539 (1983-84) (discussing kinship systems in African American communities);
Rebecca Hegar & Maria Scannapieco, From Family Duty to Family Policy: The Evolution of
Kinship Care, 74 CHILD WELFARE 200 (1995) (providing survey of kin cire in families of color).
49. Contrast this image with the description of parenthood in a black, working-class
neighborhood: "[C]hildren are 'almost never alone and very rarely in the company of only one
other person.' A crying baby is 'fed, tended, held, and fondled by anyone nearby.' Each child
seems to be the concern of each adult." Davis, supra note 9, at 360 (quoting SHIRLEY BRICE
HEATH, WAYS wrrH WORDS: LANGUAGE, LIFE, AND WORK IN COMMUNITIES AND CLASSROOMS
116-17 (1983)). Then imagine how chaotic this world could look to someone used to exclusive,
isolated, maternal parenting.
50. The child protection system has increased its reliance on extended families as resources
for foster children in the past decade, but has been slow to recognize these expansive family
networks as families. Julia Danzy & Sondra M. Jackson, Family Preservation and Support
Services: A Missed Opportunity for Kinship Care, 76 CHILD WELFARE 31 (1997); see also,
Madeline L. Kurtz, The Purchase of Families into Foster Care: Two Case Studies and the Lessons
They Teach, 25 CONN. L. REv. 1453 (1994) (describing unintended detrimental results of this
reliance).
51. Material conditions shape perceptions of motherhood. See Patricia Hill Collins, Shifting
the Center: Race, Class, and Feminist Theorizing about Motherhood, in REPRESENTATIONS OF
MOTHERHOOD 56 (Donna Bassin, et al., eds., 1994) (exploring how a white middle class feminist
focus on motherhood fails to address the material and historic conditions of other women who
do not share the privileges of financial security and family autonomy).
52. See Roberts, supra note 8, at 15 (noting how black women are punished for having
babies).
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being angry,53 wearing pants,54 or if there is a father present, for being the
family's breadwinner.55
Given this structure of child protection based at least in part on larger
institutional biases regarding motherhood, it is not surprising that women are
judged harshly and lose custody of their children. The system focuses on
maternal behavior, not on the larger conditions in which the family exists or
the fact that many of these mothers have few real choices. As a result, mothers
shoulder the blame for being homeless, beaten, young, or addicted to drugs.
The response then is to fix them: to provide therapy and teach them how to
live good, middle-class-like lives. This response too rarely includes meaningful
assessments of a mother's strengths and material needs.
PART Two: CONCRETE EXAMPLES OF BIAS
Women experience the public protective system's myopia in particularized
ways. As the following two subsections show, the state clearly, and at times
explicitly, targets women based on their gender, race and class; and unless
these women conform to dominant gendered expectations, the state will not
release their children.
A. Objective Indicators of Systemic Bias: Violence and Drugs
The system's treatment of -domestic violence and substance abuse
illustrates how it focuses on punishing and controlling women rather than on
protecting children. In both instances, the child protection system blames
women for putting their children at risk. In neither instance does the system
hold men accountable for their actions that harm children or put them at risk.
Unfortunately, while blaming the mothers, the child protection system all but
ignores the children.
Women victimized by domestic violence face a tremendous bias. If a
woman admits to being abused by her partner, she puts herself in danger of
losing her children to the state based on her failure or perceived failure to
protect them.56 Thus, instead of the child protective apparatus stepping in to
protect the children by removing their abusers, it blames the mothers and
removes the children. Moreover, these actions are to the exclusion of
53. Dohrn, supra note 3, at 9.
54. Id.
55. See, e.g., In re P.F. & E.F., 638 N.E.2d 716, 719, 721 (I11. App. Ct. 1994). The court
noted that the mother provides financial support for the family and criticized the father for failing
to "show any concern over his failure to earn a regular income." Id. at 719.
56. Dohrn, supra note 3, at 7-8; see, e.g., In re A.D.R., 542 N.E.2d 487 (ILL. APP.
CT. 1989) (upholding a finding that children whose father abused their mother were neglected
by virtue of living in an environment injurious to their welfare).
1997]
11
Appell: Protecting Children or Punishing Mothers: Gender, Race, and Class
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
providing assistance to the mother, a step that might better solve the problem.
The state uses laws passed to protect women and children from their abusers
to separate nonabusive mothers from their children, rather than abusers from
mothers and children.57 The child protection system thus blames mothers for
being abused. It assumes that the mother has created the risky environment for
the child by being involved with an abuser. In effect, she is blamed for the
behavior of the violent man. Because she is at fault, the children should not
remain in her care.
Prenatal drug use is another area that illustrates how child protection
targets women. In many states, it is prima facie neglect for a woman to give
birth to a child with a controlled substance in its system.5" There is a
universal gender bias on the face of this rule of law and a more particularized
race and class bias in its enforcement. With regard to the universal gender
bias, only maternal pre-birth conduct is defined as neglectful. Other non-sex-
specific conduct aimed at or undertaken in spite of a fetus is not grounds for
neglect. Thus, a man can beat up his pregnant wife, work around asbestos, or
smoke, but such conduct is not characterized as neglectful or abusive in the
context of child protection. 9 Indeed, were lawmakers truly concerned about
the health of babies, prenatal health care would be accessible, there would be
sufficient drug treatment for pregnant women and mothers, and nutrition
programs for women, infants, and children would be fully funded.'
With regard to race and class bias, studies have shown that although
African American and white women of all income levels use drugs and alcohol
at similar rates (with higher rates for white women),61 African American
women are drug tested during delivery more often than white women,62 and
when both are tested, black women are reported to child welfare authorities
for prenatal drug use at a significantly higher rate than their white sisters. 63
Studies have also shown that whether a mother or her child receives a
diagnosis of substance exposure is directly related to their class and the color
57. See Dohrn, supra note 3, at 7-8.
58. E.g., 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-3(1)(c) (West 1993); see also, Roberts, supra note 42,
at n.20 (listing state statutes).
59. Katha Pollitt, 'Fetal Rights'A New Assault on Feminism, THE NATION, Mar. 26, 1990,
at 409, 416.
60. Id. at 410-11 (stating "[tihe focus on maternal behavior allows the government to appear
to be concerned about babies without having to spend any money, change any priorities, or
challenge any vested interests"); see also Dorothy Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have
Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and The Right of Privacy, 104 HARv. L. REV. 1419, 1436
(1991).
61. See Chasnof, supra note 38, at 1204; Daniel R. Neuspiel, Racism andPerinatalAddiction,
in ETHNIcrry & DISEASE 1 (1995).
62. Roberts, supra note 60, at 1433.
63. Chasnoff, supra note 38, at 1204 (indicating that a black woman [i]s 9.6 times more likely
than a white woman to be reported for substance abuse during pregnancy").
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of their skin. 4 In sum, poor, minority women are much more likely to be
diagnosed with prenatal drug and alcohol use than white women with private
insurance.
B. Three Case Studies
It is evident then that the child protection system brings children into
foster care largely based on the race, class, and sex of their primary parents.
What happens after these families enter the system is equally parent-focused
and replicates the themes described above: women who behave in ways that
resemble white, middle-class, feminine, motherly paradigms get to keep their
children. Those who do not and who do not exhibit sufficient contrition or
obedience for their failure to conform are not entitled to their children. In the
meantime, their children are subjected to the harms of separation from their
families (and often their neighborhoods, communities, culture, and race)'
and the "jurogenic" 6 harms of the child protection system.6'
This viewpoint is largely absent from appellate court decisions which
constitute the main forum for narratives of women and their families involved
in the foster care system. 8 Their stories barely surface in the appellate
decisions because they are derivative and distilled through the eyes and
perceptions of caseworkers, judges, and lawyers. As a result, the mothers'
experiences have little or no imprint on the doctrine that passes as based on
true accounts.
An example of this lost experience of mothers is In re P.F. & E.F. ,69 a
review of a trial court's decision not to return home two children whom the
state removed due to inadequate housing. The opinion suggests that Sandy, the
64. Ira Chasnoff, Presentation at the National Association for Perinatal Addiction Research
and Education 1993 National Forum on Drugs, Alcohol, Pregnancy and Parenting (December 11-
14, 1993) (notes on file with author)
65. See Penny Ruff Johnson, et al., Family Foster Care Placement: The Child's Perspective,
74 CHiLD WELFARE 959, 966 (1995) (placing a child in foster care greatly changes a child's life,
often making them unable to maintain neighborly contacts or to remain in the same schools).
66. "Jurogenic" was coined from "iatrogenic" which refers to inadvertently induced
byproducts of medical treatment or diagnostic procedures. Jurogenic refers to the problems
judicial processes create while trying to solve other problems.
67. Children's negative experiences in foster care would constitute such harm. For example,
one child "described one foster family that was so hostile that he had to break out of a locked
room to steal food." Sheryl Brissett-Chapman, Child Protection Risk Assessment and African
American Children: Cultural Ramifications for Families and Communities, 76 CHILD WELFARE
45, 46 (1997).
68. Women rarely relate their own stories publicly or through the legal process. Their voices
are particularly weak when heard in legal proceedings, given their often inadequate representation
there. See supra note 9, (noting heavy case loads of attorneys representing parents).
69. 638 N.E.2d 716 (Il. App. Ct. 1994).
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mother, was stupid, uncaring, and mentally incompetent.7' The opinion
selectively recites testimony from the maternal grandmother who was vying
with the mother for custody of the children and other witnesses who Were
opposed to the mother receiving custody,71 but it recites few of Sandy's
strengths. The appellate court notes that the children came into care because
they were living with their parents in inadequate housing, without hot water
or cooking facilities.72 What the opinion does not reveal is that the children
came into care when the family home was all but destroyed in a flood that
damaged the family's entire community.73 Although the opinion notes that the
children stayed with their grandparents for the better part of each week,74 it
does not indicate that Sandy left the children there precisely because her living
conditions were inadequate. The court focuses on extensive testimony that
Sandy, her husband, and the children were usually dirty and unkempt,75 but
does not note the obvious fact that the family's hygiene problems were
primarily a result of living without water and, at times, electricity. The
opinion recites testimony suggesting that Sandy had no clue about childcare or
development, because she argued with her mother about how much creme to
put on her baby's diaper rash and was "too strict" with the children.76 In
fact, Sandy, an intelligent, loving, and religious woman, had principled ideas
about child rearing.
The appellate court, suggesting that Sandy was somehow out of touch
with reality or simply insolent, recites testimony that Sandy did not know why
the state took the children.' The court seems to miss the irony of Sandy's
statement. If the housing conditions were the cause of removal, a mother
might expect that protective efforts would focus on housing, not a psychologi-
cal make-over. Yet, the opinion is filled with evidence that the state subjected
Sandy to psychological and psychiatric assessments, required her to attend
therapy, and monitored her employment situation. Is it surprising then that
Sandy would be confused as to why her children were removed when the
articulated reason was the condition of her home and the state's involvement
had otherwise reached into every aspect of her life? The opinion also noted
that Sandy was "seriously depressed and overwhelmed."7" But is it not
natural for a mother to be seriously depressed at the loss of her children and
70. Id. at 728.
71. Id. at 719, 720-21.
72. Id. at 718-19.
73. The author knows the family through her representation of them in related matters.
74. In re P.F., 638 N.E.2d at 719.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
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overwhelmed by managing a chaotic life made more so by layers of bureau-
cratic mandates?
Although the children came into care because of the housing problems,
the opinion reveals that the children were not returned home because the
parents were not good enough.79 Sandy and her husband, the children's
father, had difficulty putting their lives together after the loss of their home
and then their children. Later, the state removed two of their subsequently
born children. Sandy and her husband placed a third child for adoption at
birth. In fact, after the state intervened, the parents ultimately separated and
relinquished all of their children for adoption. The five siblings are growing
up in four separate homes. The state managed to convince both parents that
they were inadequate to raise their own children-that others could do it
better. Sandy still talks about her children proudly and lovingly; she is in
regular contact with all but one of them. °
The differences between the appellate court's view and Sandy's own
experience illustrate that there is a dissonance between the state's perception
of these families and their own perceptions. The following narratives are
presented to give the mothers' perspectives on the child protection system."1
They also serve as a counterpoint to the ideological underpinnings of child
protection: improving children's lives by protecting them from their moth-
ers. 8
1. Janice
The state child protective agency became involved with Janice's family because
Janice was not home one afternoon when her three daughters, then six, seven, and
twelve years old, returned from school. The family was living in Janice's father's
apartment where they had been living since Janice and her long-time partner
separated several months earlier.
79. Id. at 728. In fact, the court found the children were better off in their grandmother's
"stable" home. Id. The grandmother subsequently placed the children with another family.
80. The adoptive parents of that daughter moved without giving Sandy their forwarding
address. Accordingly, Sandy lost contact.
81. Ofcourse, the narratives too are derivativebecause it is notthe mothers themselves telling
their stories, but the author who represented them in juvenile court proceedings in Chicago. The
author, self-characterized as a strong advocate who is genuinely fond of these women, is
nevertheless removed from them by class, by virtue of the type of relationship (professional
rather than personal), and in two of the cases by race. Although the author has been in their
homes, she has never been in their shoes. The names of all of the women and those of their
family members have been changed
82. These are primarily maternal narratives. The author cannot tell these children's stories
(except insofar as one of the mothers was also a child), but she is mindful that those stories must
also be told.
19971
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Janice, an intermittent but long-term drug and alcohol abuser, had been
particularly overwhelmed and depressed since her and her partner's separation. She
admitted to her child protection caseworker that she was struggling with drugs and
alcohol. Her father worked during the day but was home at night and in the
mornings. Janice's father would feed the girls breakfast and get them off to school
on mornings when Janice was out or incapacitated. There also was a very large
extended family of blood, adoptive, and in-law relations who were interested and
willing to be involved with the girls. The children were of above average intelligence
and did very well in school and their many extracurricular activities, participation in
which was encouraged by their mother. The girls adored Janice, and she was a very
loving, protective, and involved mother.
With her caseworker's help, Janice entered and actively participated in treatment
for depression and substance abuse. But when the family appeared in court, two
months after initial state intervention, the court removed the girls from Janice and
placed them in foster care. Following the court's ruling, the children went first to a
shelter and then to a foster home, where the foster mother verbally abused them.
They returned to the shelter and then proceeded to another foster home where the
oldest of the girls was raped and forced to take care of her sisters and the foster
mother's children as well. After removing them from that home, the state separated
them. The younger two went to another foster home. The oldest went to a group
home where she was violently raped and subsequently threatened by the rapist's
friends until she finally ran away. While she was on the run, she stayed in contact
with Janice, and Janice, in turn, tried to locate a safe place for her daughter to live.
Eventually, Janice found elderly relatives with whom she convinced the agency to
place her oldest daughter.
Janice is warm, charismatic, and dynamic, but she is forever taking shortcuts.
She does not think that the rules apply to her. She complied with her case plan:
attended psychotherapy, submitted to random drug screens, participated in drug
counseling, and underwent psychological evaluations. She occasionally fell off the
wagon, however, and was not a good candidate for therapy; she attended faithfully
but was not involved in the therapeutic process. Janice's caseworker, 3 the
children's attorney, and the court required Janice to provide six consecutive months
of clean drug drops and to make progress in therapy before they would return the
girls home. Due to the agency's limitations, Janice could never even submit to six
consecutive months of random drug screenings. She did not make much progress in
therapy, and in any event, she tested positive for drugs several times over the first
four years her children were in foster care.
Janice never got her girls home. The state does not even allow her to have
unsupervised visits with them. Janice is unlikely to change appreciably. She will
probably continue to use drugs and alcohol and bend the rules to suit herself.
Although she and her daughters love each other dearly, the state has grown impatient
with Janice and is preparing to terminate her parental rights.
83. Caseworker consistency was a problem for Janice and her family. They had four or five
consecutive caseworkers during a three year period. Each one had a different assessment of
Janice, and each required three to six months to acquaint themselves with Janice.
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2. Sarah
Sarah, an abused wife, had two children with her husband Edwin. Although
they met and married in Chicago, Sarah's hometown, they eventually moved to
Puerto Rico to live near Edwin's family." While in Puerto Rico, Edwin's violence
escalated, and Sarah began to fear that Edwin would direct his violence toward the
children. She fled to a friend in Arizona. While there, her then two-year-old daughter
indicated that Edwin's brother Jose, a resident of Chicago, had touched her private
parts. Sarah immediately contacted the child protection authorities. They investigated
the charges but could not make conclusive findings. They suggested that Jose might
simply have been tickling his niece and made no further recommendations or
referrals.
Eventually, Edwin convinced Sarah to return with the children. After a
honeymoon period, the abuse returned, and again it escalated. Sarah fled. This time,
she and the children went to Chicago where she stayed from place to place while
trying to scrape together bus fare back to Arizona. With nowhere to live, she and the
children moved in with Jose. At some point, she even had an affair with him. When
her daughter, then four-years-old, told her that Jose had hurt her private parts, Sarah
became furious. She immediately confronted Jose who became angry and set fire to
the apartment while Sarah and the children were inside. Sarah reported Jose to the
police for arson and sex abuse. The police arrested Jose and contacted the child
protection agency. This time, the authorities were able to diagnose the sex abuse of
Sarah's daughter. They found no abuse of her brother.
Initially, the child protection investigator planned to allow the children to remain
with Sarah. The investigator, however, changed her mind after discovering that Sarah
had slept with Jose and that two years earlier she had suspected Jose of sexually
abusing her daughter. The investigator disapproved of a wife sleeping with her
husband's brother and felt that, because they had a sexual relationship at some point,
Sarah must have somehow sanctioned or collaborated in the abuse. The investigator
convinced the court to remove both children from Sarah, even though the boy had
not been abused.
The child protection agency placed the children in foster care. In response, the
children became angry and confused, and they missed their mother.15 As a result,
they were somewhat challenging as foster children. Despite Sarah's constant
pressure, it took the agency nearly six months to enroll the children in counseling.
6
The first foster family asked for the children's removal within one week of their
84. Her family, of Eastern European heritage, disowned her when she married Edwin, who
was Puerto Rican.
85. They were also angry at her. Due to their developmental ages, they felt abandoned by her.
They could not fully appreciate why they were no longer living with their mother.
86. One of the weaknesses of the child protection system is its failure to treat the children
once it removes them from a dangerous situation. See Anthony M. Graziano & Joseph R. Mills,
Treatment for Abused Children: When is a Partial Solution Acceptable?, 16 Crimp ABUsE &
NEGLECr 217 (1992) (noting that psychological counseling is underutilized for maltreated
children).
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placement. The situation was not much better in the second foster home. Sarah had
concerns about how the foster parents were treating the children, but she did not
push the matter because she did not want her children to experience the trauma of
another move. Eventually, however, the foster mother admitted that she wanted to
kill Sarah's daughter. Shortly thereafter, the state removed the children. The next
foster home, their third within six months, was much better.87
In the meantime, Sarah was very taxing on her caseworkers. Extremely
concerned about her children, she called the caseworkers daily to discuss the
children, their needs, and their progress. Sarah diligently worked at completing the
four pages of tasks set forth in the case plans her caseworkers had drafted. The early
plans did not require assistance to Sarah for housing or obtaining a job, although
later plans did. When a domestic violence counselor submitted a report stating that
Sarah should have unsupervised visits" with the children and that the family should
be reunited, the agency fired the counselor and sent Sarah to a more traditional
therapist.
The court reunited the family in stages. Sarah first had to prove herself in short
unsupervised visits. Then she made longer visits, until she finally had overnight and
then weekend visitation with her children. Two successfilly completed case plans
later and fourteen months after the court removed her children, it returned them
pursuant to a court order listing twenty tasks and obligations for Sarah to fulfill. Nine
months later, the court closed the case.
3. DeeDee
DeeDee's mother Debra is an alcoholic. 89 DeeDee had been living with her
great-grandmother Doris since DeeDee was about eight years old. When DeeDee was
about eleven, Doris moved into publicly-funded senior citizen housing that was more
affordable and much safer than her previous apartment. Unfortunately, housing
regulations prohibited residents from sharing their apartments with non-senior
citizens. Doris brought DeeDee with her, but when the housing authorities discovered
the arrangement, Doris was forced to choose between her home and her granddaugh-
ter. Having no other family to shelter her, DeeDee entered the child protection
system.
The state took custody of DeeDee and placed her in a group home because there
were no foster homes available to take her at the time.' A smart girl and a good
student, DeeDee was independent and did not like to follow the rules of the group
home. She often stayed over at Doris' apartment without the group home's
87. These foster parents, more experienced and better trained than the previous ones,
understood their role to be one of care-givers for the children until they could be returned to their
mother.
88. The agency permitted Sarah to see her children one time per week for one hour, under
supervision. Each visit required Sarah to travel two hours each way.
89. DeeDee is a composite of several teen wards the author represented while serving in her
capacity as guardian ad litem and attorney.
90. There is a serious shortage of foster homes. Brown, supra note 35, at 70.
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permission, and other times she stayed with friends or relatives with whom the
agency had not authorized her to stay.
At age fourteen while under the state's care and guidance, DeeDee got pregnant.
At fifteen, she delivered a healthy, full-term baby boy. The agency's first instinct
was to remove the new born due to DeeDee's youth, but it could not convince the
court that there was cause for removal. It was, however, able to obtain court
supervision of the baby. The court, therefore, oversaw DeeDee's life as a ward and
as a mother. The agency sent her to live at a state shelter for pregnant and parenting
teen wards.
DeeDee hated having her baby at the shelter because it was infested with
roaches. She kept him with her in her bed at night to protect him, but the staff
insisted that she let him sleep in his crib. So, DeeDee left the group home. She
stayed with Doris as much as possible, but it was hard to conceal the presence of an
infant from the housing authorities. When she was not with Doris, she stayed with
friends or other relatives and sometimes her stepfather. She also stayed with her
son's father's family (the father's name is Jason).
Although young and inexperienced, DeeDee provided for her son's needs,
attended to his medical care, and gave him love and attention. Doris and Jason's
mother helped DeeDee with her parenting skills, and Jason, a recent high school
graduate now attending a trade school, helped as much as he could financially.
Without childcare or a stable address, DeeDee had to drop out of high-school.
The caseworker's primary goal for DeeDee and her son was to get them back
to the shelter. The caseworker also established a case plan that required DeeDee to
attend parenting classes, get a psychological evaluation, obtain a. high school graduate
equivalency degree, and go to counseling. In addition, because DeeDee mentioned
that she had tried smoking marijuana a couple of times with other wards at the group
home, the caseworker required DeeDee to submit to drug testing and a substance
abuse evaluation.
The court eventually ordered the baby into foster care because DeeDee refused
to stay at the shelter and did not comply with the tasks in the case plan. The agency
refused to place him with his paternal grandmother because of her support of
DeeDee. Instead, it placed him with suburban foster parents who refused to allow
DeeDee or Jason to come to their home. The agency scheduled parent-child visits
during regular business hours which also coincided with the agency's hours. Jason
was rarely able to attend because he could have lost his job if he missed too much
work. DeeDee attended most weeks but was discouraged by visiting her infant son
for only one hour per week in agency offices. Every week she watched as her son
slipped away from her and became more the son of the couple who was raising him.
She became pregnant again several months after he was taken from her.
PART THREE: SHARED THEMES
Each of these three women had problems: one with drugs, one with
violence, and the other with dependency. These problems placed their children
at risk and resulted in actual abuse to one child. The state intervened because
of these risks. But the state's intervention was arguably unnecessary in all of
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the cases and certainly not helpful in any of them. Further, state intervention
caused significant detriment to the children. The following themes emerge
from these women's stories.
A. Failure To Utilize Existing Support Systems
Janice, Sarah, and DeeDee had support systems in place to help them and
their children. Although Janice's use of drugs and alcohol compromised her
parenting,9 it did not place the children in danger because her father was
also in the home. Both Janice and DeeDee had kin systems in the community
willing and able to help. Sarah's support system was the least accessible
because it was across the country, but she could have relied on the domestic
violence programs until relocating to Arizona became possible. All of the
mothers loved and nurtured their children. In turn, the children were attached
to their mothers and thrived in their care. Yet, instead of bolstering these
relationships by assisting the mothers to strengthen ties to existing support
systems, the state removed the children from their mothers and these support
systems.
B. Ill-defined Scope of Involvement
The state removed each of the children ostensibly because their mothers
placed them at risk. The state's involvement, however, did not directly address
the risk. Janice's children were left home alone. A more direct response to this
problem would have been to help Janice develop a care plan for her daughters
to accommodate her absences. Instead, the state chose to address underlying
issues in Janice's life that could lead to irresponsible parenting: her drug use
and non-compliant personality. Having identified these maladies, the state
backed itself and the family into a comer, for until Janice was cured, it could
not return her children to her. A cure, however, was unlikely.
Sarah's daughter was sexually abused. The abuser was in jail. The state,
nevertheless, removed both the abused and non-abused child from Sarah's care
because she made bad choices. The state did not comprehend the vulnerable
and desperate position in which Sarah found herself: a single mother fleeing
from an abusive husband, with no other friends or family to take her in.
Instead of addressing the protective issue-the family's need for a safe place
to live and the daughter's need for sex abuse counseling-the state chose to fix
the parts of Sarah's personality that impacted on her decision-making ability.
It is not clear whether Sarah was fixed, but the state was able to extricate itself
because she complied with the tasks in her case plan.
91. See Beyer, supra note 44, at 328 (describing how substance abuse can seriously impair
parenting functions).
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The protective issues in DeeDee's case are less clear. The state appears
to have removed her son due to DeeDee's youth and failure to follow her case
plan. The scope of the state's involvement was defined by DeeDee's age and
non-compliance. A supportive environment and responsive plan would have
encouraged DeeDee's compliance, but only time would solve the age problem.
In the meantime, however, her son would become attached to another family.
The state would be in a bind because by the time DeeDee grew up, it would
traumatize her son to remove him from his foster family. The state will
probably not face that dilemma because DeeDee will likely remain non-
compliant, giving the state grounds to terminate her parental rights and place
her son for adoption by his foster parents.
C. Failure To Provide Meaningful Services
Janice needed help with the depression and disorientation that was brought
on by her separation from her partner and impacted on her drug and alcohol
abuse. The state worsened the problem when it removed her children,
depriving Janice of a major support device and a reason for sobriety. 2 She
became extremely depressed without her girls and had a hard time responding
to treatment. Moreover, once the state removed the children, Janice lost her
financial and medical coverage and could no longer afford her therapy,
depression medication, or carfare to attend her after-care drug program.'
Sarah needed bus fare to Arizona. Alternatively, she needed a place for
her and her children to live and recover from the trauma they had endured.
The state did not give that to the family. Instead, it took her children, ordered
her go to therapy, and made her comply with numerous tasks listed in her case
plan.
DeeDee needed a place to live. She had family and friends who were
willing to shelter her and help her care for her baby, but as a state ward,
DeeDee was relegated to foster care or a group home. Ideally and if the state
really wanted to help her and her son, it would have used the money it spent
on her group home to pay rent on an apartment for her and her grandmoth-
er. 94
92. See Beyer, supra note 44, at 330 (noting that keeping children at home is strong
motivation for maternal success in substance abuse treatment).
93. As a mother with dependant children, Janice received government support-including
medical insurance. As a woman without children, she was no longer entitled to those benefits.
94. DeeDee's story particularly illustrates the intersection of rigid government bureaucracies
that wind up working at cross-purposes. The housing authority rules prohibited a grandmother
from providing a home for her dependant grandchild; that prohibition in turn caused DeeDee's
son to become a child in need of protection. Neither agency recognized or accommodated
DeeDee's extended and perfectly adequate family system.
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Instead of exhibiting sophistication, flexibility, and attentiveness regarding
the mothers' needs, the state provided services according to administrative
convenience. Thus, it limited parent-child visitation to one hour per week
during times and at places convenient to the agencies rather than the parents.
It required the parents to participate in available programs, rather than
identifying, developing or locating more responsive services. In addition to
failing to utilize existing supports, the state continued to require DeeDee and
Janice to comply with services that the two mothers had clearly rejected and
did not find helpful. DeeDee's case is particularly illustrative of this problem.
DeeDee's caseworker did not help her to repair any parenting deficiencies,
find another place to live, or obtain things for the baby. On the contrary, the
shelter provided all of those services; so, the caseworker required DeeDee to
go back to the shelter, even though DeeDee clearly did not want to be there.
D. Elevation of Form over Substance
The state removed DeeDee's son because she failed to follow her case
plan. The state returned Sarah's children because she followed directions and
complied with all of her assigned tasks. 5 DeeDee's and Janice's children
remain in care because the two mothers did not complete their case plan tasks.
Ironically, of the three families, Sarah's children were harmed the most while
in their mother's care: her daughter was sexually abused at least once, perhaps
twice; both children were victims of arson; and both had no doubt wit-
nessed-and perhaps were victimized by-violence in their home. Yet, they
returned home because Sarah complied with all of the tasks on her case plan.
In contrast, the state never proved that Janice's and DeeDee's children were
harmed while with their mothers. Their mothers simply had lifestyles of which
the state did not approve.
E. Failure to provide for the children
The state was not particularly attentive to the children's needs either. In
the first place, it hurt the children by removing them from their primary care
givers.9" Sarah's children especially suffered from the initial removal. They
had been traumatized by family violence, several moves, a fire, and sexual
abuse, and then they were removed from their mother-the one safe, stable,
and nurturing aspect of their lives.
95. Sarah exhibited the same good parenting skills and deep concern for her children both
before and after state involvement, yet it was her compliance with her case plans that the court
and agency monitored and rewarded.
96. See ALBERT J. SOLNrr, ET AL., WHEN HoME is No HAVEN 13-16 (1992) (reviewing the
effects on the children of separation from their primary care-givers); see also Brissett-Chapman,
supra note 67, at 50.
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While in foster care, none of the six children fared particularly well.
Janice's children suffered the most. In four years, they had at least four
different homes, and they were ultimately separated from each other. Janice's
oldest daughter was abused in three of her placements and raped twice. As
minors, none of Janice's children will ever return home. In fact, the two
youngest daughters may be adopted. Failing adoption, all three will be foster
children until they reach eighteen and the state terminates its involvement.'
Sarah's children too suffered numerous placements-three within about
six months. Although the state apparently removed the children because of the
serious trauma they had suffered, the agency failed to address their trauma for
months. Indeed, the state added to the trauma by removing them from Sarah
and then by limiting their contact with her to one hour per week.
DeeDee and her son found themselves placed outside the family and kin
network that was once woven around DeeDee. The state separated the boy
from his community entirely and placed him in a suburb apart from mother,
father, grandparents, aunts, uncles, and others who loved and supported him
and his mother. The boy will lose contact completely when the state terminates
parental rights so that foster parents can adopt him. At least he may grow up
with one family in a safe environment,9" but he may never know the wealth
that he left behind.
F. A Caveat
These themes are common and pervasive in the child protection system,
but not all caseworkers, courts, or agencies are so limited. Indeed, many
innovative and community-based programs are being developed or are already
thriving throughout the country. Even the court that presided over these cases
has begun to initiate changes to improve treatment and oversight of mothers
and children. Although caseloads remain very high,' the court has recently
seen an increase in the quality and number of judges committed to change. "
97. Teenaged wards are trained for "independent living" so that by the time they are finished
with high school and reach majority, they can, with the help of foster care and the state, find
their own apartments and divorce themselves from protective services. 42 U.S.C. § 675(1)
(1994).
98. Like any other family, it is also possible that his adoptive parents will divorce, that they
will abuse or neglect him, that they will become ill or lose their jobs and even their home. See
Appell & Boyer, supra note 21, at 78 (noting the unpredictability of future outcomes involving
child custody decisions).
99. Judges are responsible for about 3,500 cases each, and attorneys are responsible for at
least 300. Louise Kierman, Murdered Son Might Be Catalyst for Hope, CHI. TMB., July 26,
1996, § 1 at 1.
100. See id. (describing improvements resulting from new leadership, which includes a new
presiding judge, and a restructuring of the juvenile court).
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Further, the foregoing themes should not imply that the state's child
protection system is entirely without value. On the contrary, child abuse and
neglect is a serious problem that leads to nearly two thousand child deaths
each year.'' There are significant numbers of mothers who are unable or
unwilling to care for their children. Many children surely benefit from state
intervention and even find good, stable, loving homes away from their
families. The child protection system, however, cannot guarantee that its
charges will find such homes. Given its limitations, the state should be careful
to focus on child protective issues rather than maternal make-overs.
PART FOUR: CAUSES AND SUGGESTIONS
The systemic problems in the child protection industry are inextricably
related to race, class, gender, and the countless other social institutions that
both weaken and devalue women and their families. A pertinent question then
is how, apart from a societal restructuring of support for children,"° can the
child protection system better serve children. The following are thoughts on
why the system has become so focused on mothers and how it could focus
more productively on children while respecting the mother-child relationship.
A. Child Protection Bureaucracies
It is no secret that local child protection agencies are not meeting their
mandates. te More than a decade after the federal government enacted
funding legislation designed to protect against the over reliance and abuses of
foster care, the states are still failing to provide the meaningful supports that
would allow families to remain intact or reunify after foster care."°4 In fact,
nearly half of the states are under court supervision for failing to provide basic
services to children in need of protection."°5
101. Robert Pear, Many States Fail to Meet Mandates on Child Welfare, N.Y. TIMES
(NATIONAL), Mar. 17, 1996, at 1. But see Nelson, supra note 7, at 238-40 (suggesting that there
is no need for the child protection industry, at least as currently structured).
102. See, e.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON F NEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL
FAMILY 230-33 (1995) (arguing for a redefinition of family as the mother-child dyad and
provision of public, rather than private, support to mothers for dependant care).
103. Levesque, supra note 13, at 1-2.
104. See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS,
FOSTER CARE (Aug. 1989); Beyer, supra note 44, at 312-13 (pointing out that despite enactment
of the Adoption Assistance & Child Welfare Act "anti-family policies and practices died
slowly ... [s]ixteen years [later] ... children continue to be subjected unnecessarily to the
trauma of lengthy separation from their families").
105. Pear, supra note 98, at 1 (noting "outrageous deficiencies" in a "Dickensian" child
protection system); see also Susan L. Brooks, Note, Rethinking Adoption: A Federal Solution to
the Problem of Permanency Planning for Children with Special Needs, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1130,
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In the meantime, the numbers of children in foster care keep grow-
ing,"°6 and the caseworkers cannot keep up."t0 In the wake of these rising
caseloads, children are taken from their mothers without meaningful attempts
to assist the family.' The heavy demand in fact hinders the.provision of
services to protect and support families."° Instead of offering meaningful
assistance, caseworkers too often take a cookie cutter approach to the families
and their problems."0 The problems become interchangeable, the serious
ones indistinguishable from the minor ones;"' and needs are generalized and
defined according to what services are currently available."
To compound these challenges, caseworker turnover is high, and
caseworkers themselves are largely under educated and under trained."'
Thus, they are frequently unable to assess risk, evaluate the needs or dynamics
of families, and access services." 4 These problems compromise the child
protection system's mission and consequently harm children by giving rise to
the following maladies:
(1) [a] lack of services to prevent initial placement; (2) a decline in the
number of children discharged from out-of-home care; (3) increased
1132 (1991) (noting a large percentage of foster children going from one placement to another
and that some are further subjected to abuse and neglect).
106. For example, between 1990 and 1992, the number of children in foster care rose 8.3%.
CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, THE STATE OF AMERICA'S CHILDREN YEARBOOK 1994 89 (1994).
107. Levesque, supra note 13, at 10-11. The Child Welfare League reported that caseworkers
were often responsible for 50 to 70 cases, although standards recommend they carry no more than
15 cases each. Pear, supra note 98, at 1. In addition, child abuse and neglect reports doubled
between 1980 and 1991. Brissett-Chapman, supra note 67, at 51. Although half of these reports
are unsubstantiated, they still require child protection investigatory resources.
108. See Beyer, supra note 44, at 313 (concluding that "[m]any neglected or abused children
removed from loving but overwhelmed parents could be safely protected in their own homes if
agencies provided sufficient services").
109. See, e.g., Brissett-Chapman, supra note 67, at 50.
110. See id. "Even for child welfare workers who believe in family preservation, implementing
the philosophy in their day-to-day practice has been difficult. Inadequate services, inflexible
agency policies and disjointed funding streams are obstacles to family preservation." Beyer, supra
note 44, at 313.
111. The story of the Mann Family, told in a 1991 PBS documentary, presents a tragic
example of this problem. After years of abuse and ineffective state intervention, Adam Mann's
parents finally killed Adam. Adam's siblings, most of whom had also been abused, went into
foster care when their parents were jailed. Four years later, they remained in foster care, their
chances of being adopted dwindling as the months passed. Celia W. Dugger, Escaping Abuse but
Not Neglect: Children Languish in Foster Care, N.Y. TIMEs, July 27, 1994, at Al.
112. Beyer, supra note 44, at 324.
113. Brown & Bailey-Etta, supra note 35, at 68-69.
114. See Brissett-Chapman, supra note 67, at 60 ("As financial resources continue to dwindle
in contrast to demands and needs, we are standing witness to the deprofessionalization of the
governmental response.").
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reentry into out-of-home care following periods of family reunification that
fail due to lack of supportive services; and (4) a decline in the number of
family foster homes available for child placement.
115
In addition, because the lawyers who represent the children are often
untrained and without resources,116 the court system suffers similar weak-
nesses in assessment and evaluation.117 Crowded dockets additionally create
barriers to meaningful review. Both problems essentially disable the courts'
oversight functions.118 These limitations in turn undermine gatekeeping: too
many families needlessly come into the system," 9 and too few exit in a
timely fashion, if at all.' This ineffective gatekeeping creates a vicious
circle-by keeping caseloads high, the system forecloses its ability to provide
meaningful assessment and review of whether families should be in or out.
Improved training of caseworkers, lawyers, and judges could help
ameliorate many of these problems. A more sophisticated approach to risk
assessment, family dynamics, child development, and cultural diversity would
likely improve both the identification of at-risk families and service provision
to these families. 21 Moreover, a reorientation of the agency role from
deficit-driven to strength-based assessment and service provision would most
probably improve outcomes." This approach would involve families and
115. Brown & Bailey-Etta, supra note 35, at 68.
116. Judges hearing child protection matters in Chicago carry up to 3000 cases. Laura Duncan,
States Attorney's Office Adds 20 Lawyers for Surging Abuse and Neglect Caseload, CHI. DAILY
L. BULL., Feb. 24, 1994, at 1. Likewise, children's lawyers in Chicago represent an average
of 350 children each. Bob Secter, Children's Guardian Draws Criticism, CHI.-SUN TIMES,
Mar. 20, 1995, § 1, at 14.
117. See HowzE, supra note 43 (discussing need for new methodology and cultural
competency in child protection proceedings).
118. The Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat.
501 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), mandates court review of key
decisions.
119. In addition, many families who need assistance may never make it in.
120. Brown & Bailey-Etta, supra note 35, at 69-70.
121. See, e.g., Brissett-Chapman, supra note 67, at 48 (noting widespread call for child
protectionprofessionals "to acknowledge cultural differences and the larger community context");
Kathleen Wells & Elizabeth Tracy, ReorientingIntensive Family Preservation Services in Relation
to Public Child Welfare Practice, 75 CHILD WELFARE 667 (1996) (arguing for interdisciplinary,
community-based, developmentally targeted assessment and service provision to families); see
also Beyer, supra note 44, at 318-19 (describing how understanding of cultural issues surrounding
a deaf family improved service provision and outcome for the at-risk child).
122. Beyer, supra note 44, at 314-15. Assessment and service provision to families at risk for
child abuse and neglect is complex and inextricably attached to other governmental policies and
programs. Id. at 68. Moreover, there are serious questions about how child protective agencies
themselves are structured. See, e.g., Pelton, supra note 10, at 491 (arguing for "transformation
of current public child welfare agencies into family preservation agencies by divesting them of
their investigative, child removal, and foster care roles").
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their kin systems in the development of case plans to insure that they are
meaningful and helpful to the families." Furthermore, such an approach
mandates that when families do not follow through on case plans, different
plans should be developed,"2 not that the mothers should be deemed failures
like DeeDee and Janice.
These improvements could reduce the number of unnecessary family
disruptions and decrease the time children spend in foster care by providing
for quicker reunification or termination of parental rights."z The sophisticat-
ed approach would also lead to a decrease in caseloads, and with a decrease
in caseloads, child protection agencies and courts could be more attentive to
the families and better discern their risks and needs.
B. Legal Grounds for State Involvement
Another way of approaching the problem is through the scope of
permissible state involvement. There are two sides to state involvement:
(1) when the state can intervene in child-rearing; and (2) when the state can
extricate itself after intervening. Any standard for intervention should dictate
what areas the state may address and the standard for extrication should dictate
what outcomes the state can seek in those areas. Both standards are intimately
related to the scope of involvement. If the standards for intervention and
extrication are clear but inconsistent, they may compromise the clarity of the
scope of involvement. In addition, if the standards for intervention or
extrication are themselves unclear, then the state's role will also be unclear.
Currently, the standards for intervention tend to be parent-focused; for
extrication, they tend to be child-focused. Both focuses are problematic
because neither is sufficiently grounded. By looking at the parent or child in
isolation, these standards provide inadequate safeguards against biased,
punitive, and ill-defined intervention. Standards based on the parent-child dyad
may provide the balance and grounding the child- or parent-focused standards
lack. The following is an exploration of these standards and how they impact
on the quality and scope of involvement.
1. The Parent-Focused Inquiry
According to constitutional and family law, the state cannot, for the most
part, coercively intervene into the family unless the parents' conduct places the
123. Id. at 315-16.
124. Id. at 317.
125. See Linda Katz, Concurrent Planning: Fifteen Years Later, ADOPrALK, Spring 1996, at
12 (working toward fhmily reunification can lay the groundwork for termination of parental rights
if reunification is unsuccessful).
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child's health, safety, or welfare at significant risk of harm.'6 The state may
not intervene simply because it believes that there is a better way to raise
children. 27 Instead, the state must have an interest in child protection.
Standards for state extrication are less clear.
a. Intervention
The state may initiate child protection proceedings only when the parents
have fallen below some minimum parenting standard such that the children
are, or are at risk of, being harmed. This standard for intervention is parent-
focused. It assesses whether the parent is failing the child. The state is not
permitted to look solely at the child's well-being or suffering and step in for
the parents. Hence, if a child is harmed in an accident while in someone else's
care or sexually abused by a neighbor, or teacher, the state has no cause to be
involved unless the parent intentionally or recklessly put the child in that
position.
Accordingly, state child protection statutes permit state intervention when
the child has been harmed or is at risk due to some parental failing. 2 In
their exact language, these statutes permit protective intervention when a child
has been "abused" or "neglected," and sometimes when the child is "at risk"
of abuse or neglect." 9 These grounds are imprecise and difficult to ap-
ply. 3' Neglect and risk of harm are particularly nebulous and subjective
concepts. 3 ' The lack of clarity leaves the state without sufficient guidance
126. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972) (requiring the state to conduct individualized
inquiry into parental fitness before removing child from father's custody); see also Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (ruling that a state cannot require Amish families to send children
to high school); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (holding that a state cannot
compel attendance at public schools);Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (holding that a
state cannot prohibit teaching of foreign language).
127. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 862-63
(1977) [hereinafter, Smith v. Organization of Foster Families].
128. See NATIONAL CLEARINGHOUSE ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT STATE STATUTE SERIES NUMBER 1,
REPORTING LAWS: DEFINITIONS OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT (1996) (compiling state
definitions).
129. E.g., 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-3(2)(ii) (West 1993) (defining "abused minor" to
include one subjected to a substantial risk of physical injury); 5/2-3(1)(b) (defining "neglected
minor" to include one whose "environment is injurious to his or her welfare" with a clear
implication towards parental responsibility); 405/2-18(2)(f) (dictating that proof a parent's
repeatedly using drugs is evidence of abuse or neglect).
130. Elizabeth Hutchison, Child Maltreatment: Can it be Defined? in CHILD WELFARE
RESEARCH REvIEw 6 (Richard Barth, et al., eds., 1994); Marion Huxtable, Child Protection:
With Liberty and Justice for All, 39 Soc. WORK 60 (1994).
131. Pelton, supra note 10, at491. Indeed, definitions of child abuse and neglect vary not only
among each of the states and federal law, but also among professional disciplines. Brissett-
Chapman, supra note 67, at 53.
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as to the reason for and scope of its involvement and results in needless
disruption of families.
One alternative is to allow the state to intervene only when the child has
been or is about to be physically harmed. 32 This option would clarify and
narrow the grounds for intervention as most cases stem from claims of neglect.
But permitting state intervention only in instances where children have been
or are about to be physically harmed is also problematic. Neglect can be more
insidious than abuse and can be very dangerous, even life threatening, for
children. Although the line between neglect and poverty or child-rearing
values is uncomfortably blurry, state intervention based on neglect may be
essential to protect children. As such, the state should better clarify what
constitutes neglect and require a direct nexus between parental conduct and the
child's safety.
Whether intervention is based on abuse or neglect, as long as application
or conceptualization of the need for intervention revolves around parental
failings, the state's involvement will tend to be punitive rather than protective.
For if the parent is at fault, then the purpose of intervention will be to fix the
parent. Any mother who does not conform to dominant social norms is at risk
of losing her children, no matter how tenuous the connection between the
mother's behavior or status and her child's actual or imminent harm. From
this perspective, the state's conduct in the preceding case studies makes sense.
The state intervened because of the mothers' behavior or status: Janice was a
drug abuser, Sarah an abused wife and adulterer, and DeeDee a rebellious
teenager.
b. Extrication
The state can terminate its involvement either by returning a child home
or by consummating the child's adoption.'33 For the latter method, the state
must prove that the parent is unfit. This is clearly a parent-focused inqui-
ry.P In contrast, standards for returning a child home are more variable and
not subject to well developed constitutional guidance.
135
132. Another alternative is to raise the state's burden of proof to intervene. See, e.g., J. Bohl,
"These Privileges Long Recognized. " Termination of Parental Rights Law, The Family Right to
Integrity and the Private Culture of the Family, 1 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 323, 327 (1994).
133. The state can also extricate itself by ceding guardianship to a private party. Nevertheless,
the state's involvement is merely dormant because the parent or guardian may invoke the court
at any time to protect the parent-child relationship (through proceedings to dismiss the guardian
and reinstate the parent or enforce reasonable visitation, for example).
134. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982); see also Johnson, supra note 34, at 411-12
(discussing the parent-based inquiry as well as several departures that look to children's interests).
135. For example, in Illinois, courts may return children home only if it is in their best
interests. 705 ILL. CoMp STAT. 405/2-23(1)(a) (West Supp. 1996). In South Carolina, the court
may return the child when it "would not cause an unreasonable risk of harm" to the child. S.C.
CODE ANN. § 20-7-766(c) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1996).
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A parent-focused inquiry might look to whether the parent corrected the
conditions that led to state removal. If the state simply asked whether the
parent had corrected the conditions that led to intervention, then presumably
the decision to extricate would be quite definite. Indeed, because the child
protection apparatus does in fact intervene when a parent has failed, it
understandably seeks to cure the parent's failings prior to extrication. 3 '
Nevertheless, if the conditions that lead to intervention are broadly or deeply
defined to include all aspects of the mother's life, such as poverty or
personality characteristics, then grounds for extrication through family
reunification, though more definite, would rarely occur. On the other hand;
the state could easily prove grounds for termination of parental rights due to
parental failure to correct these conditions.
Additionally, this parental focus appears to contribute to the punitive
nature of the child protection system. The problem again stems from the
state's addressing the root causes of the mother's failings rather than practice
of protecting the children. And again, with this parent-focused perspective in
hand, the state's treatment of the mothers in the narratives makes sense: In
Sarah's case, the state sought to insure that she will not become involved with
any more abusive men. In Janice's case, the goal was to identify and correct
whatever problems in her early family life caused her to turn to drugs.
Finally, in DeeDee's case the state aimed to train her to be more compliant.
These interventions ignore the living conditions that the three mothers faced.
Thus, the state overlooked the violence, poverty, and the lack of housing,
jobs, and childcare facing these women and focused on their psyches instead.
Such overreaching is doomed to failure and further decreases the state's
chances of meeting children's needs. As the narratives indicated, the children's
needs came second to rehabilitating the mothers.
A parental focus also fails to account for the needs of children whose
parents may be fit but for whom a return home would not be in the interests.
For example, as a result of long stays in foster care, children may form
significant attachments to their foster parents. Others might simply be
extremely fearful of their parents. Many states, therefore, permit a child to
stay in foster care if it would be best for the child.'37 With long-term foster
care placements that raise questions about a child's best interests, merely
correcting the material conditions that brought the child into care would not
guarantee successful family reunification. Thus, the state must weigh the birth
parents against the foster parents, or more precisely, the unknown risks of
'136. See Graziano & Mills, supra note 87, at 217 ("Social and psychological interventions in
child physical abuse and neglect focus primarily on parents.").
137. See Meryl Schwartz, Reinventing Guardianship: Subsidized Guardianship, Foster Care,
and Child Welfare, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 441,444-45 (1996) (describing reasons
children may remain in foster care); Johnson, supra note 34, at 403-4 (noting that custody
determinations weigh attachments children form to foster parents).
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returning the child home with the known, but more containable, risks of foster
care. This best interests of the child standard, as discussed in the next section,
has its own shortcomings.
2. The Child-Focused Inquiry
Focusing solely on the child would appear to be the logical goal of child
protection proceedings. The converse of the parent-focused standard, which
marginalizes children, is the child-focused standard, which itself pushes
parents to the margins. Just as the marginalization of children compromises the
utility of the parent-focused standards, the marginalization of parents is
problematic because it decontextualizes the child.
A purely child-focused inquiry arguably would look to the child's
interests, 3 ' an inquiry that, for the purposes of this essay, would be tanta-
mount to a best interests of the child standard.139 Such a best interests
standard encourages individualized consideration of a child's unique circum-
stances,"4 but decision-making on behalf of children in isolation is extremely
difficult because of their undeveloped capacity to provide explicit information
or direction. 141 Moreover, there are no clear rules for what factors to include
or how to weigh them when determining the best interests of the child. As a
result, a purely child-focused inquiry does not offer sufficient guidance for
either state intervention or extrication.
138. A full exploration of child-focused standards is beyond the scope of this essay, but simply
put, child-focused inquiries could address either harm to the child (actual or imminent) or the
interests of the child. The two standards are easily conflated. An interests standard would assess
whether the child's interests are being or can be served. An actual or imminent harm standard
would address whether the child is being harmed or is at risk of being harmed. If harm were
construed as physical harm, it would be underinclusive because it would not target childrenwhose
other essential needs were not being met. See supra text accompanying notes 93-95. If harm
were defined more broadly, it would be less distinguishable from an interests standard because
the latter weighs harms and benefits to the child's interests and chooses the best (or least harmful)
alternative. In any event, both standards exhibit similar features and infirmities arising out of
their focus on the child.
139. Once viewing a child's interests, it is only natural, although not inevitable, to try to
promote the best outcome.
140. Although vulnerable to abuse, the best interest of the child has potential for being a richly
child-centered, textured, and thoughtful approach to decision-making involving children. E.g.,
Jean Koh Peters, The Roles and Content of Best Interests in Client-Directed Lawyering for
Children in Child Protective Proceedings, 64 FODHAM L. REv. 1505 (1996).
141. This is particularly true of preverbal children. See Annette R. Appell, Decontextualizing
the Child Client: The Efficacy of the Attorney-ClientModelfor Very Young Children 64 FORDHAM
L. REv. 1955 (1996) (arguing that barriers to obtaining information from a child's parent or
significant others limits decision-making on behalf of child); see also Peters, supra note 138
(providing a deeply contextual approach to determining a child's best interest).
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a. Intervention
Using a best interest of the child standard for state intervention is
problematic for at least two reasons. First, it is arguably unconstitutional.'
Second, because of its pure child-focus and indeterminacy, it does not identify
in which children's lives the state should intervene. For example, it does not
dictate which of the following children the state should protect:
" a child who has been sexually abused but her mother does not believe
in sending her to therapy;
* children who witness violence in the home;
" children raised by single mothers;
* all children living in certain neighborhoods;
" children who attend below average schools;
* children raised in certain religions;
" children who watch television or those who do not.
Unanchored by parental conduct, the child-focused inquiry applies to any child
whose interests are or may be compromised.
This lack of guidance is compounded by the standard's subjectivity and
indeterminacy. There is no agreement among social scientists or child
protection professionals as to what constitutes the best interests of children or
any particular child. 43 The United States is a diverse society with absolute-
ly no consensus on child rearing practices, lifestyle, morality, or religion."
Even if there was consensus on what set of criteria should determine a child's
best interests, there is no agreement on how to balance those factors. 45 In
addition, the best interests standard disproportionately impacts poor families
and families of color. 4 6 As it is, society more easily accepts intervention
into those families than middle class families of the dominant culture.147
142. See, e.g., Reno v. Flores, 113 S. Ct. 1439, 1448 (1993) (emphasizing that "[e]ven if it
were shown, for example, that a particular couple desirous of adopting a child would best provide
for the child's welfare, the child would nonetheless not be removed from the custody of its
parents so long as they were providing for the child adequately"); DeBoer v. DeBoer, 509 U.S.
1301, 1302 (1993) (Stevens, Circuit Justice) (denying an application for the stay of an order to
return a child to her birth parents and noting that no law "authorizes unrelated persons to retain
custody of a child whose natural parents have not been found to be unfit simply because they a
may be better able to provide for her future and her education").
143. Appell & Boyer, supra note 21, at 77-78.
144. Id. at 79.
145. Id. at 80-81.
146. Id. at 79-80.
147. See Guggenheim, supra note 10; Stack, supra note 48, at 547; see also Santosky v.
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 763 (1982) (holding that termination of parental rights "proceedings are
often vulnerable to judgments based on cultural or class bias"); Smith v. Organization of Foster
Families, 431 U.S. 816, 834 (1977) (noting that middle-class social workers treat the poverty of
the natural parents as detrimental to the best interests of the child).
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Utilizing the best interests of the child as an intervention standard could
lead to a large-scale usurpation of the parental role by the state and would
magnify existing class, race and gender biases. What is more, social science
does not provide tools to determine whether such intervention would be
appropriate or helpful. Nor is it evident that the state has the resources or will
to provide homes for children that are better than those their parents would
provide.
b. Extrication
Best interests is also a problematic standard for state extrication, even
though it is frequently the standard used for return home4' and sometimes
the standard for termination of parental rights.'49 Just as the standard's
indeterminacy and subjectivity militate against its use in the intervention
context, these same characteristics limit the standard's utility as an extrication
tool. For example, the standard provides little guidance about how to weigh
the changing needs of a child over time. What is best for the child now may
not be best when the child is a teenager or an adult. 50 Moreover, social
science does not provide reliable tools to accurately predict long-term
outcomes of decisions made on behalf of children.'5 '
Another problem with the best interests standard is that, like the parent-
focused standard, it guides reunification service providers toward making ideal
parents. It thus widens the scope of involvement to include creating or
searching for the best parents. Unlike the parent-focus which addresses the
goodness of mothers, the child-focus weighs mothers against other parental
figures, such as foster or adoptive parents. Particularly when race, gender,
and class bias are largely determinative of which parents the state is evaluating
in the first place, the state will be hard-pressed to return children home. Too
many natural parents will never be good enough. And if the state does not
return children, then it must maintain them in foster care or place them for
adoption. In addition, because there are more children in need of adoptive
homes than there are families wanting to adopt, the state will continue to be
responsible for a growing number of foster children.15 ' The best interests for
148. Guggenheim, supra note 10, at 551; e.g., In re P.F., 638 N.E.2d at 716, 724; In re
Ashley K., 571 N.E.2d 905, 923 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991); In re J.B.S., 863 P.2d 1344, 1348-50
(Wash. 1993).
149. See Johnson, supra note 34, at 411-12 (noting termination of parental rights based on best
interests of the child).
150. Appell & Boyer, supra note 21, at 80-81.
151. Id. at 78-79. Longitudinal studies have shown that predictions made about the long-term
development of children were wrong two-thirds of the time. Id. at 78.
152. See, e.g., Guggenheim, supra note 34 (noting growing numbers of children in need of
adoptive homes who are not being adopted).
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the child standard then actually compromises the state's ability to extricate
itself.
Utilizing this standard for Janice and DeeDee, the state effectively insures
that their children will not return home. Janice cannot be the best placement
for her children until she is better, more stable. DeeDee, a young, single, poor
mother will never compare favorably to the middle-class, two parent, suburban
foster family. These children will stay in foster care until the state can develop
evidence to terminate parental rights or, as is likely in the case of Janice's
girls, until they reach adulthood. Sarah, who is white and the most middle
class of the three mothers, was able to prove herself worthy. In any event, the
foster parents did not seek to keep her children from her.
3. The Parent-Child Focused Inquiry
If focusing on the parent or the child individually is problematic, perhaps
the answer is not to look solely at either. Focusing on one or the other loses
sight of the parent-child relationship, a relationship which the constitution
protects. 53 Such an analysis arises out of and maintains focus on the parent-
child dyad and provides much needed grounding for state involvement. 154
The standard first defers to the parent-child identity of interests and from that
basis, assesses whether the parent is able to provide minimal care for the child
and make decisions on behalf of the child.'55 This approach would recognize
that state intervention should be based on protecting and strengthening the
parent-child relationship, rather than intervening despite the relationship.
The parent-child approach begins with legally recognized parent-child
relationships and views parenting within that context broadly. Parents direct
the care, custody, and upbringing of their children. They need not provide
these functions directly but instead may delegate them. 156 Thus, some parents
hire nannies; others send their children to live with relatives; others use day
153. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 759-60 (1982) (holding that until the parents are
proven unfit, the parent and child share an interest in their relationship); see also Caban v.
Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (both cases holding
that family integrity protection arises out of parent-child relationship).
154. This approach also constitutes good social work practice which looks to "multiple,
interactive causes pertaining to the child, the child's care-giver, and the environment" when
assessing child maltreatment. Wells & Tracy, supra note 119, at 673.
155. See Beyer, supra note 44, at 318-23 (discussing minimally adequate care standard).
156. This unification of legal parental relationships and parental functions guards against the
indeterminacy of defining the parent-child relationship solely in functional terms. See Martha L.
Minow, Redefining Families: Who's In and Who's Out? 62 U. COL. L. REv. 269, 276-77 (1991)
(proposing that the functional approach "will expose real people to enormously varied rules that
create their own kind of unpredictability" and jeopardize "the security of anyone's family"); see
also Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 844 (1977) (distinguishing between
protection of birth families and foster families even though the two function similarly).
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care or boarding school; some home school; some use public schools; and
many delegate most, if not all parental functions to the other parent.1
7
Though parents may delegate parental functions, that delegation does not
dissolve the parent-child relationship. 58 On the contrary, delegation of
parental functions is the very exercise of the parental relationship. The parent-
child focus recognizes and respects the diversity of parent-child relationships
and examines whether the parent is exercising her role such that the parental
functions are fulfilled and the child is protected. It does not assess the parent's
status or second-guess her choices apart from their bearing on accomplishment
of parent functions.
A strength of the relational focus is that each end of the dyad anchors the
other. Whereas the parent-focus looks to parental status or conduct without
sufficient regard to whether that status or conduct significantly interferes with
meeting the child's needs, the relational approach examines whether the
parent-child relationship is significantly compromised such that the child's
needs are not being met. Contrary to the child-focus, which looks solely to the
child's interests without sufficient regard to the child's preexisting and
persistent family ties, the relational focus views the child as part and parcel of
the family, not as an unattached and idealized entity.
a. Intervention
Although the standard for intervention might remain abuse and ne-
glect,15 9 the question would be whether the parent's functioning is deficient,
not whether the parent is. Rather than assessing who the parents are, whether
they have failed, or whether the children are living in optimal conditions, a
relational investigation would assess whether the parents are willing and able
to meet the children's basic needs directly or through the assistance of others.
Looked at through this lens, the state might not have intervened in
Janice's, Sarah's or DeeDee's families. Instead of looking at whether Janice
used drugs, the state would have determined whether Janice was ensuring that
the girls' needs were being met. Similarly, although the state would have
assessed whether Sarah could protect her children from the abusive men in
their lives and whether Sarah was in fact complicit in the sex abuse, the state
would not have removed the children simply because Sarah had sex with the
man who abused her daughter or because she had been involved with violent
157. Private family law respects this particular delegation when it considers both the
functioning and non-functioning parents as custodial options for the child.
158. They may, however, completely abdicate the parental relationship by delegating both
parental role and functions. Parents do this when they voluntarily relinquish their children for
adoption. Joan H. Hollinger, Introduction to Adoption Law & Practice, in ADOPTION LAW &
PRACrICE, 1-9 to 1-10 (Joan H. Hollinger, ed., 1992).
159. The definitions of these grounds could use some fine tuning. See Hutchison, supra note
128; Huxtable, supra note 128.
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men. The state certainly would not have had grounds to interfere with Sarah
and her son's relationship. In DeeDee's case, the state would have looked at
whether her son was receiving appropriate care and not whether she was
complying with her case plan or living in the shelter.
b. Extrication
Similarly, the standard for closure of a case would be whether the parent
is able to resume the parental role, not whether the parent has dealt with issues
surrounding her own childhood or whether she has stopped using drugs.1
Although these issues may be relevant to parenting, the question should be
whether their mother's drug use prohibits her from parenting her children. If
she only uses drugs away from the hoine when the children are otherwise
cared for by a capable care-giver, then she is not abdicating her parental role
but rather delegating some functions.
Were the state looking through the parent-child lens in Janice's case, it
would not have required her to go to therapy or even be drug free. Instead it
would have looked to whether her children were safe in her care or whether
she could insure their safety elsewhere: whether they were old enough to care
for themselves if necessary; whether Janice could avoid using drugs When
responsible for her children's care; whether she could assure that they had
sufficient food, clothing, shelter, love, and schooling. The state would have
returned Sarah's children as soon as she had a place for them to live. Its
involvement would have revolved around helping her find a safe and
supportive place for the family and assisting her to know how to address her
daughter's needs arising from her sexual abuse. The state would have helped
DeeDee find a more stable place to live, hopefully with one of the several
supportive mentoring adults in her life.
Focusing on the parent-child relationship in the context of parental roles
and supports would lead to more definite, child focused and less punitive
intervention. On the other hand, it might not be sufficiently child-focused
when determining whether to end intervention. After all, the child protection
system moves slowly and children develop and adapt quickly. It would be
harsh to remove a child from a safe, stable environment just because the
mother is able to resume her parental role. But given the weaknesses of the
best interest standard and children's deep and persistent attachments to their
160. South Carolina appears to be moving in this direction. Upon removal of a child, state
law requires a plan that first identifies what necessitated removal and then what the parent must
do to correct those conditions. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-764(B)(1) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1996).
This law should militate against preparation of "generic," "cookie cutter" case plans. Mary
Williams, Evaluating a Placement Plan,in 2 CHILDREN'S LAW REPORT No. 2 (Mar. 1997).
Nevertheless, the statute widens the scope of involvement by mandating review and remedy of
"[o]ther conditions in the home that warrant state intervention, but would not alone have been
sufficient to warrant removal." S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-764(B)(2) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1996).
[Vol. 48:577
36
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 48, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 4
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol48/iss3/4
PROTECTING CHILDREN OR PUNISHING MOTHERS
families of origin," erring on the side of determinacy and clarity might stillbe the better approach. 12
CONCLUSION
A close review of the child protection system reveals that by and large it
is not working. There may be disagreement about why that is, whether it is the
parents' fault or the system's, but there is no question that changes are needed.
Although many of the problems relate directly and inextricably to larger social
and institutional biases, accessible tools exist for improving child protection
systems. First, adequate training of the caseworkers, lawyers, and judges who
decide whether children are at risk and how to ameliorate those risks is
crucial. Second, review of the standards for intervention and extrication may
reveal that the current reliance on parental fault and the best interests of the
child subjects families and the state to indefinite goals and purposes and place
children in limbo.
Child protection appears to be a system out of focus. Although its
mandate is to protect children, its treatment of mothers like Sandy, Janice,
Sarah, and DeeDee suggests that it is more concerned with controlling women.
Too many families find their way into the system because of their mother's
conduct, race, or class rather than because of a clear protective need. Systemic
recognition of this phenomenon is essential if it is to refocus itself away from
punishing mothers and toward protecting children.
161. Appell, supra note 18, at 1011, 1014-15.
162. For discussion of the vying interests between family and foster parent attachments, see
Symposium, Helping Families in Crisis: The Intersection of Law and Psychology, 22 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & SOC. CHANG. 295 (1996); Symposium, The Impact of Psychological Parenting on
Child Welfare Decision-Making, 12 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE, 485 (1983-84).
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